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Abstract— Detecting attacks in control systems is an impor-
tant aspect of designing secure and resilient control systems.
Recently, a dynamic watermarking approach was proposed
for detecting malicious sensor attacks for SISO LTI systems
with partial state observations and MIMO LTI systems with
a full rank input matrix and full state observations; however,
these previous approaches cannot be applied to general LTI
systems that are MIMO and have partial state observations.
This paper designs a dynamic watermarking approach for
detecting malicious sensor attacks for general LTI systems, and
we provide a new set of asymptotic and statistical tests. We
prove these tests can detect attacks that follow a specified attack
model (more general than replay attacks), and we also show
that these tests simplify to existing tests when the system is
SISO or has full rank input matrix and full state observations.
The benefit of our approach is demonstrated with a simulation
analysis of detecting sensor attacks in autonomous vehicles.
Our approach can distinguish between sensor attacks and wind
disturbance (through an internal model principle framework),
whereas improperly designed tests cannot distinguish between
sensor attacks and wind disturbance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure and resilient control requires the development of
mechanisms to allow safe operation in the face of mali-
cious attacks or external interferences. This is particularly
challenging for cyber-physical systems (CPS) that feature
interconnection between physical sensors and actuators with
the communication and computation capabilities of routers,
servers, etc. Such concerns are motivated by real-world
instances of attacks on CPS, including: the Maroochy-Shire
incident [1], the Stuxnet worm [2], and other incidents [3].
For control systems, two possible modes of attacks are
either an attacker inserting faulty measurements into the
output sensor signal or an attacker inserting malicious values
into the actuator input for the control system. Cybersecurity
techniques [4], [5], [6], [7] are an important component
of designing resilient CPS. However, CPS frequently has a
decentralized structure; and so approaches that detect attacks
by decoupling different sensing and actuating components of
the system are particularly useful for ensuring safe operation.
This paper designs a dynamic watermarking approach for
detecting malicious sensor attacks for general LTI systems,
and has two main contributions: First, we generalize the wa-
termarking approach developed in [8] for SISO LTI systems
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with partial state observations and MIMO LTI systems with
a full rank input matrix and full state observations under an
arbitrary attack, and our generalization applies to general LTI
systems under a specific attack model that is more general
than replay attacks [9]. Second, we show that modeling
is important for designing watermarking techniques: For
instance, dynamic watermarking was used to detect sensor
attacks in an intelligent transportation system [10]; however,
here we show that persistent disturbances such as those
from wind can invalidate watermarking approaches, and we
propose an approach based on the internal model principle to
compensate for persistent disturbances. This second contribu-
tion motivates our generalization of dynamic watermarking
to general MIMO LTI systems with partial observations,
since internal model states are never directly observed.
A. Watermarking for CPS
Defense and security for CPS is classified into either
detection and identification [3], [11], [12], and a number of
“passsive” techniques have been proposed. State estimation
algorithms [13], [14] have been suggested in order to handle
attacks on the physical plants within a CPS. Another related
approach [15] provides a metric to characterize the resilience
of a system facing stealthy attacks on the actuators.
More recently, “active defense” based on watermarking
has been developed for detecting sensor attacks [8], [10],
[16], [17], [18], [9], [19]. The idea is that honest (i.e.,
not compromised by an attacker) actuators superimpose a
random signal onto the control input to ensure security in
face of sensor attacks. One set of approaches [16], [17],
[18], [9], [19] develops statistical hypothesis tests that detect
attacks with a certain error rate, while dynamic watermarking
approaches [8], [10] develop a test to ensure that only
attacks which add a zero-average-power signal to the sensor
measurements can remain undetected. The first set of tech-
niques applies to general LTI systems under specific attack
models, but cannot ensure the zero-average-power property
for attacks; while the second set of techniques applies to
specific LTI systems under general attack models. Our first
contribution in this paper is to partially bridge the gap
between these two techniques by developing a method that
applies to general LTI systems under specific attack models
and that ensures the zero-average-power property for attacks.
B. Security for Intelligent Transportation Systems
The design of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) is
receiving increased attention [10], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24],
[25], and one significant area for further study is the design
of methods to ensure the safe and resilient operation of
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ITS. One recent work [10] considered the use of dynamic
watermarking to detect sensor attacks in a network of au-
tonomous vehicles coordinated by a supervisory controller;
the watermarking approach was successfully able to detect
attacks. However, large-scale deployments of ITS must be
resilient in the face of persistent disturbances from environ-
mental and human factors. Wind is an example of such a
persistent disturbance. A second contribution of this work is
from the perspective of modeling: We show that persistent
disturbances such as those from wind can invalidate wa-
termarking approaches, and we propose an internal model
principle-based approach to handle persistent disturbances.
This motivates our generalization of dynamic watermarking
to general MIMO LTI systems with partial observations,
since internal model states are not directly observed.
C. Outline
Section II reviews the general LTI system model (i.e.,
MIMO systems with partial observations) and specifies our
attack model, and Sect. III provides intuition on why existing
dynamic watermarking approaches cannot by used on a
general LTI system. We construct a detection consistent
dynamic watermarking approach for general LTI systems
under our attack model in Sect. IV, and our term detection
consistent test is used to refer to a test that ensures the
zero-average-power property (described above) for attacks.
Next, Sect. V describes how our asymptotic tests can be
converted into statistical tests, and Sect. VI shows how our
tests are special cases of those in [8] for the SISO case or
the MIMO case with full rank input matrix and full state
observations. We conclude with Sect. VII, which conducts
simulations of an autonomous vehicle: Our tests are able
to distinguish between sensor attacks and wind disturbances
when including wind disturbance in the system dynamics us-
ing the internal model principal, while improperly designed
tests cannot distinguish between attacks and wind.
II. LTI SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
Let [r] = {1, . . . , r}, and consider a MIMO LTI system
xn+1 = Axn + Bun + wn with partial observations yn =
Cxn + zn + vn, where x ∈ Rp, u ∈ Rq , and y, z, v ∈ Rm.
The vn should be interpreted as an additive measurement
disturbance added by an attacker, while wn represents zero
mean i.i.d. process noise with a jointly Gaussian distribution
and covariance ΣW , and zn represents zero mean i.i.d.
measurement noise with a jointly Gaussian distribution and
covariance ΣZ . We further assume the process noise is
independent of the measurement noise, that is wn for n ≥ 0
is independent of zn for n ≥ 0.
If (A,B) is stabilizable and (A,C) is detectable, then a
stabilizing output-feedback controller can be designed when
vn ≡ 0 using an observer and the separation principle. Let K
be a constant state-feedback gain matrix such that A+BK
is Schur stable, and let L be a constant observer gain matrix
such that A + LC is Schur stable. The idea of dynamic
watermarking in this context will be to superimpose a private
(and random) excitation signal en known in value to the
controller but unknown in value to the attacker. As a result,
we will apply the control input un = Kxˆn+en, where xˆn is
the observer-estimated state and en are i.i.d. Gaussian with
zero mean and constant variance ΣE fixed by the controller.
Let x˜T =
[
xT xˆT
]
, and define BT =
[
BT BT
]
, C =[
C 0
]
, DT =
[
I 0
]
, LT =
[
0 −LT], and
A =
[
A BK
−LC A+BK + LC
]
(1)
Then the closed-loop system with private excitation is given
by x˜n+1 = Ax˜n +Ben +Dwn + L(zn + vn). If we define
the observation error δ = xˆ − x, then with the change of
variables xˇT =
[
xT δT
]
we have the dynamics xˇn+1 =
Axˇn + Ben + Dwn + L(zn + vn), where BT =
[
BT 0
]
,
DT =
[
I −I], L = L, and
A =
[
A+BK BK
0 A+ LC
]
. (2)
Recall that A is Schur stable whenever A+BK and A+LC
are both Schur stable.
Since the controller is fixed, we can suppose the attacker
chooses vn = α(Cxn + zn) + Cξn + ζn for some fixed
α ∈ R, where ξn+1 = (A + BK)ξn + ωn, ζn are i.i.d.
Gaussian with zero mean and constant variance ΣS fixed
by the attacker, and ωn are i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean
and constant variance ΣO fixed by the attacker. The idea
underlying this attack model is that the attacker allows some
fraction of the true output Cxn + zn to be measured by
the controller, and at the same time also incorporates the
measurement of a false state ξn that evolves according the
dynamics that would be expected under the controller.
III. INTUITION FOR DESIGNING A NEW TEST
To better understand how to design a new test, it is
instructive to apply existing dynamic watermarking schemes
and the associated tests [8] to particular LTI systems. Such
an exercise provides intuition that we use to design new tests.
Our main example is an LTI system with
A =
[
1 1
0 1
]
, B =
[
0
1
]
, and C =
[
1 0
]
. (3)
Suppose the attacker chooses vn = −(Cxn + zn) + Cξn +
ζn with ΣS = ΣZ and ΣO = ΣW , meaning the output
measurement yn = Cξn + ζn has no component from the
actual system. This is a SISO (i.e., m = q = 1) system with
partial state measurement, and the tests in [8] pass for this
example, even though the sensor has been compromised by
an attacker. The problem in this example is that the test
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 L(Cxˆn − yn)eTn−1 = 0 (4)
from [8] correlates the innovations process L(Cxˆn − yn)
with the private excitation only one step back in time en−1;
however, it takes two time steps for the control input to enter
into the output in this example. And so when designing a new
test for general LTI systems, we need to take into consider-
ation that there is generally some delay between when some
private excitation is applied to when it is observed.
IV. DETECTION CONSISTENT TEST
Now let ΣX be the positive semidefinite matrix that solves
the following
ΣX = AΣXA
T +BΣEB
T +DΣWD
T + LΣZL
T. (5)
Note that ΣX = as-limN 1N
∑N−1
n=0 xˇnxˇ
T
n. Similarly let Σ∆
be the positive semidefinite matrix that solves the following
Σ∆ = (A+ LC)Σ∆(A+ LC)
T + ΣW + LΣZL
T. (6)
Note Σ∆ = as-limN 1N
∑N−1
n=0 δnδ
T
n and Σ∆ = MΣXM
T,
where M =
[
0 I
]
. Recall that ΣX and Σ∆ exist because
the above are Lyapunov equations with matrices A, (A+LC)
that are Schur stable.
Lemma 1: We have that
ArB =
[
(A+BK)rB
(A+BK)rB
]
(7)
for all r ≥ 0
Proof: The result holds for r = 0 since A0 = I and
(A + BK)0 = I. Now suppose the result holds for r: We
prove that it holds for r + 1. In particular, note that
Ar+1B = A
[
(A+BK)rB
(A+BK)rB
]
=
[
(A+BK)r+1B
(A+BK)r+1B
]
, (8)
where the first equality holds by the inductive hypothesis,
and the second equality follows by calculation of the matrix
multiplication. Hence the result follows by induction.
Proposition 1: Let A(α) = A+ αH with
H =
[
0 0
−LC 0
]
, (9)
and define k′ = min{k ≥ 0 | C(A + BK)kB 6= 0}. Then
we have that A(α)kB = AkB for 0 ≤ k ≤ k′.
Proof: If k′ = 0, then the result holds trivially. So
assume k′ ≥ 1. We have that A(α)0B = A0B = B since
A(α)0 = A0 = I. Now suppose A(α)kB = AkB for 0 ≤
k ≤ k′ − 1. But using Lemma 1 implies that
A(α)k+1B = Ak+1B + αH
[
(A+BK)kB
(A+BK)kB
]
=
Ak+1B + α
[
0
−LC(A+BK)kB
]
= Ak+1B, (10)
where we have used that LC(A+BK)kB = 0 since k < k′.
And so the result follows by induction.
Now let k′ = min{k ≥ 0 | C(A + BK)kB 6= 0}, and
consider the following tests
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 (Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)T =
CΣ∆C
T + ΣZ (11)
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 (Cxˆn − yn)eTn−k′−1 = 0. (12)
Theorem 1: Suppose (A,B) is stabilizable, (A,C) is de-
tectable, ΣE is full rank, and k′ = min{k ≥ 0 | C(A +
BK)kB 6= 0} exists. If the test (11)–(12) holds, then
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 v
T
nvn = 0, (13)
meaning that vn asymptotically has zero power.
Proof: Observe that the dynamics for x˜ are given by
x˜n+1 = A(α) · x˜n+Ben+Dwn+L((1+α)zn+Cξn+ζn),
where A(α) = A+αH with H given in (9). Next note that
a basic calculation gives
x˜n = A(α)
kx˜n−k +
∑k−1
k′=0A(α)
k−k′−1(Ben+k′−k+
Dwn+k′−k + (1 + α) · Lzn+k′−k+
LCξn+k′−k + Lζn+k′−k
)
. (14)
If we define C =
[−C C], then Cxˆn − yn = Cx˜n − α ·
Cx˜n − (1 + α) · zn −Cξn − ζn, and so for k ∈ [p] we have
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 E
(
(Cxˆn − yn)eTn−k
)
=
(C − α · C) ·A(α)k−1BΣE . (15)
Note that k′ ≤ p − 1 by the Cayley-Hamilton theorem. So
combining Proposition 1 with (15) implies
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 E
(
(Cxˆn − yn)eTn−k′−1
)
= (C − α · C) ·Ak′BΣE
= −α · C ·Ak′BΣE
(16)
where the second equality holds by by Lemma 1 and the
definition of C. Because the test (12) holds, the quantity
(16) should equal 0. But since ΣE is full rank by assumption,
Sylvester’s rank inequality implies C ·Ak′BΣE 6= 0 since
C ·Ak′B =
[
0
C(A+BK)k
′
B
]
6= 0, (17)
where the first equality holds by Lemma 1 and the definition
of C. Thus we must have α = 0.
Next consider the expression
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 (Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)T =
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 (Cxˆn − (1 + α) · (Cxn + zn)− Cξn − ζn)×
(Cxˆn − (1 + α) · (Cxn + zn)− Cξn − ζn)T. (18)
We showed above that α = 0, and so the expectation of the
above expression is
CΣ∆C
T + ΣZ + ΣS +
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 E
(
Cξnξ
T
nC
T
)
+
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 C(A+BK)
N−1x0(C(A+BK)N−1ξ0)T. (19)
Since (A+BK) is Schur stable, the associated property of
exponential stability implies
limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 C(A+BK)
N−1x0(C(A+BK)N−1ξ0)T = 0
(20)
by combining the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality with the expo-
nential stability. However from the test (11), the expectation
must equal CΣ∆CT +ΣZ in the limit. Since all the terms in
the above expectation (19) are positive semidefinite or have
zero limit, this implies
ΣS + as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 E
(
Cξnξ
T
nC
T
)
= 0. (21)
Finally, consider the expression
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 vnv
T
n =
1
N
∑N−1
n=0
(
(α(Cxn+zn)+Cξn+ζn
)×(
α(Cxn + zn) + Cξn + ζn)
T). (22)
Since α = 0, the expectation of the above expression is
ΣS +
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 E
(
Cξnξ
T
nC
T
)
+
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 C(A+BK)
N−1x0(C(A+BK)N−1ξ0)T. (23)
Combining (20)–(23) implies as-limN 1N
∑N−1
n=0 vnv
T
n = 0.
However, vTnvn equals the sum of the diagonal entries of
vnv
T
n. Thus we have as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 v
T
nvn = 0.
Existence of k′ = min{k ≥ 0 | C(A + BK)kB 6= 0} is
easy to verify because Cayley-Hamilton implies k′ ≤ p− 1
or it does not exist, but we also give sufficient conditions.
Corollary 1: Suppose (A,B) is controllable, (A,C) is
observable, and ΣE is full rank. If the test (11)–(12) holds,
then
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 v
T
nvn = 0, (24)
meaning that vn asymptotically has zero power.
Proof: We claim that, under the conditions stated, k′ =
min{k ≥ 0 | C(A + BK)kB 6= 0} ≤ p − 1 exists. Indeed,
since (A,B) is controllable we have that: (A + BK,B) is
controllable, and the controllability matrix
C =
[
B (A+BK)B . . . (A+BK)p−1B
]
(25)
has rank(C) = p. And so by Sylvester’s rank inequality, we
have rank(CC) ≥ rank(C) + rank(C)− p = rank(C). But
(A,C) is observable, and so the observability matrix
O =

C
CA
...
CAp−1
 = diag(C, . . . , C)

I
A
...
Ap−1
 (26)
has rank(O) = p. Again applying Sylvester’s rank inequality
implies p rank(C) ≥ rank(O) = p, or equivalently that
rank(C) ≥ 1. Combining this with the earlier inequality
gives rank(CC) ≥ 1, and so CC 6= 0. This means k′ ≤ p−1
exists since CC is a block matrix consisting of the blocks
C(A+BK)kB. Thus the result follows by Theorem 1.
V. STATISTICAL VERSION OF TEST
For the purpose of implementation, we can also construct
a statistical version of our test (11)–(12). Our approach is
similar to [8] in that we construct a hypothesis test by
thresholding the negative log-likelihood. Before defining the
test, we make the following useful observation:
Proposition 2: Let ψTn =
[
(Cxˆn − yn)T eTn−k′−1
]
. The
test (11)–(12) holds if and only if the following test holds:
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 ψnψ
T
n =
[
CΣ∆C
T + ΣZ 0
0 ΣE
]
. (27)
Moreover, if the test (11)–(12) holds or equivalently the test
(27) holds, then we have that as-limn E(ψn) = 0.
Proof: The equivalence between (11)–(12) and (27)
follows from the definition of ψn and of the tests. Next
suppose either (equivalent) test holds: Using the dynamics
on xˇ we have E(xˇn+1) = AE(xˇn) + LE(vn). But we have
vn = C(A + BK)
nξ0 + C
∑n−1
k=0(A + BK)
n−k−1ωk + ζn
since α = 0 as shown in the proof of Theorem 1, and
so E(vn) = C(A + BK)nξ0. Since (A + BK) is Schur
stable, we have limn E(vn) = 0 and hence limn E(xˇn) =
A limn E(xˇn). This means that limn E(xˇn) = 0 since I−A
is full rank (which can be seen by recalling that A is Schur
stable, so cannot have any eigenvalue of exactly one, and thus
det(sI−A) 6= 0 for s = 1). Since Cxˆn − yn =
[
0 C
]
xˇn,
we have that E(Cxˆn − yn) = 0. This implies E(ψn) = 0
since E(en−k′−1) = 0 by construction.
This result implies that asymptotically the summation
Sn =
1
`
∑n+`
n+1 ψnψ
T
n with ` ≥ m + q has a Wishart
distribution with ` degrees of freedom and a scale matrix
that matches (27), and we use this observation to define a
statistical test. In particular, we check if the negative log-
likelihood
L(Sn) = (m+ q + 1− `) · log detSn+
trace
([
(CΣ∆C
T + ΣZ)
−1 0
0 Σ−1E
]
× Sn
)
(28)
corresponding to this Wishart distribution and the summation
Sn is large by conducting the hypothesis test{
reject, if L(Sn) > τ(α)
accept, if L(Sn) ≤ τ(α)
(29)
where τ(α) is a threshold that controls the false error rate
α. A rejection corresponds to the detection of an attack,
while an acceptance corresponds to the lack of detection of
an attack. This notation emphasizes the fact that achieving
a specified false error rate α (a false error in our context
corresponds to detecting an attack when there is no attack
occurring) requires changing the threshold τ(α).
VI. RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING TESTS
It is interesting to compare our test (11)–(12) to those
designed in [8]. More specifically, [8] designed a related
sequence of tests adapted to different (and less complex)
assumptions about the model dynamics. We will show that
our test is closely related to (and generalizes) these previous
tests developed under assumptions of less complex dynamics.
The simplest test in [8] was designed for systems with
direct state measurement (i.e., C = I), no measurement error
(i.e, zn ≡ 0), and full rank input matrix (i.e, rank(B) =
p). The SISO (i.e., m = p = q = 1) and MIMO cases
were considered separately in [8], though the SISO case is a
special case of the MIMO case. If we choose L = −A, then
we have that: yn = xn+vn, xn+1 = Axn+BKxˆn+Ben+
wn, xˆn+1 = Ayn + BKxˆn + Ben, Σ∆ = ΣW , and k′ = 1
since rank(CB) = p. So our test (11)–(12) simplifies to
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 (yn+1 −Ayn −BKxˆn −Ben)×
(yn+1 −Ayn −BKxˆn −Ben)T = ΣW (30)
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 (yn+1 −Ayn −BKxˆn −Ben)×
eTn = 0. (31)
This exactly matches the test designed in [8] for LTI systems
with the above described properties.
0 10 20 30 40 50
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-2
-1
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2 10
-4 Test (11) with Wind Model
Un-Attacked
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Fig. 1. Deviation of (11) in Simulation of Autonomous Vehicle
A more complex test in [8] was designed for SISO (i.e.,
m = q = 1) systems with partial state measurement. In our
notation, the tests in [8] for this case simplify to
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 L(Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)TLT =
L
(
CΣ∆C
T + ΣZ
)
LT (32)
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 L(Cxˆn − yn)eTn−1 = 0. (33)
But k′ = 1 since B is a nonzero vector and rank(CB) = 1 in
this case. So the test (32)–(33) from [8] essentially matches
our test (11)–(12), but with the difference that the test in [8]
considers quantities with L(Cxˆn−yn), while our test directly
considers quantities with Cxˆn − yn; this is a negligible
difference since Cxˆn − yn is a scalar in this SISO case.
VII. SIMULATIONS: AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
A standard model [26] for error kinematics of lane keeping
and speed control has xT =
[
ψ y s γ v
]
and uT =
[
r a
]
,
where ψ is heading error, y is lateral error, s is trajectory dis-
tance, γ is vehicle angle, v is vehicle velocity, r is steering,
and a is acceleration. Linearizing about a straight trajectory
and constant velocity v0 = 10, and then performing exact
discretization with sampling period ts = 0.05 yields
A =

1 0 0 110 0
1
2 1 0
1
40 0
0 0 1 0 12
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
 B =

1
400 0
1
2400 0
0 1800
1
20 0
0 120
 (34)
with C =
[
I 0
] ∈ R3×5. We used process and measure-
ment noise with ΣW = 10−8 and ΣZ = 10−5, respectively.
0 10 20 30 40 50
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-10
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0
5 10
-3 Test (12) with Wind Model
Un-Attacked
Attacked
Fig. 2. Deviation of (12) in Simulation of Autonomous Vehicle
Our simulations used the wind model: dn+1 = 0.9dn + χn,
where χn are i.i.d. zero mean Gaussians with σ2χ = 2×10−6,
and the wind state d entered additively into the y dynamics.
We applied our tests using a dynamic watermark with
variance ΣE = 12 I, where K and L were chosen to stabilize
the closed-loop system without an attack. We conducted
four simulations: Un-attacked and attacked simulations were
conducted with a test computed without wind in the sys-
tem model, and un-attacked and attacked simulations were
conducted with a test computed with wind in the system
model. In both attack simulations, we chose an attacker with
α = −0.6, ξ0 = 0, ΣO = 10−8, and ΣS = 10−8. Fig. VI
shows ‖ 1N
∑N−1
n=0 (Cxˆn−yn)(Cxˆn−yn)T−CΣ∆CT−ΣZ‖,
and Fig. VI shows ‖ 1N
∑N−1
n=0 (Cxˆn−yn)eTn−k′−1‖. If the test
is detection consistent, then these values go to zero. The plots
show dynamic watermarking cannot detect the presence or
absence of an attack when wind affects the system dynamics
but is not included in the test, while our test sdetect the
presence or absence of an attack when a model of wind is
included in the test. Fig. VII shows the results of applying
our statistical test (28), and the same behavior is seen.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper constructed a dynamic watermarking approach
for detecting malicious sensor attacks for general LTI sys-
tems, and the two main contributions were: to extend dy-
namic watermarking to general LTI systems under a specific
attack model that is more general than replay attacks, and to
show that modeling is important for designing watermarking
techniques by demonstrating how persistent disturbances can
negatively affect the accuracy of dynamic watermarking. Our
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Fig. 3. Value of (28) for Simulation of Autonomous Vehicle, with a Negative Log-Likelihood Threshold for α = 0.05 False Detection Error Rate
approach to resolve this issue was to incorporate a model of
the persistent disturbance via the internal model principle.
Future work includes generalizing the attack models that
can be detected by our approach. An additional direction
for future work is to study the problem of robust controller
design in the regime of when an attack is detected.
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